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NOT SOCRATES, BUT PROTAGORAS: THE SOPHISTIC BASIS
OF LEGAL EDUCATION*
WILLIAM C. HEFFERNAN**
This essay takes seriously law professors' claim that they teach
according to Socratic method. The claim may not always be put
forward in all seriousness; in fact, it may sometimes be intended
more as a conceit than as an accurate description of the techniques
of legal education. But if reference to Socratic method does involve
a conceit, then it is surely the conceit of legal education1 and, as
such, deserves careful consideration no matter how fancifully it
may be proposed. If, on the other hand, reference to Socratic
* Copyright 0 1981 William C. Heffernan
** Assistant Professor of Law, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of
New York. B.A. 1968, Columbia University, M.A. 1974, Ph.D. 1976, Harvard University;
J.D. 1978, University of Chicago. I would like to thank Rogers Brubaker, Rolly Phillips,
Barbara Porton, James White and William Young for comments made on earlier drafts of
this essay.
1. For a sampling of references to Socratic method, see J. REDLCH, THE COMMON LAW
AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIvERsrTY LAW SCHOOLs: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANcEMENT OF TEACHING 12, 25, 29, 30, 51, 69 (1914) [hereinafter
cited as REDLICH]; Fuller, On Teaching Law, 3 STAN. L. Rxv. 35, 40 (1950); Gilmore, The
Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 YALE L. J. 217 (1964); Keeton,
Warren Abner Seavey-Teacher, 79 HA~v. L. REv. 1333, 1335 (1966); Kelso, Teaching
Teachers: A Reminiscence of the 1971 AALS Law Teachers Clinic and a Tribute to Harry
W. Jones, 24 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 606, 607 (1972); Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A
Polemic, 1 YALE REv. OF LAw ANm Soc. ACT. 71, 73 (1970); Ladd, Edmund M. Morgan, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1546, 1548 (1966); Meltsner & Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76
COLUM. L. REv. 581, 582n (1976); Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Educa-
tion: Its Origins, 4 J. OF LEGAL EDuc. 1, 17 (1951); Patton, The Student, the Situation and
Performance During the First Year of Law School, 21 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 10, 38 (1968);
Prosser, Warren Seavey, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 1338, 1339 (1966); Richardson, Does Anyone
Care for More Hemlock?, 25 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 427, 434-41 (1973); Savoy, Towards a New
Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 457 (1970); Scott, Samuel Williston, 76 HARv.
L. REv. 1330, 1331-32 (1963); Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REv. 392,
406-07 (1971); Taylor, Law School Stress and the 'Deformation Professionelle' 27 J. OF
LEGAL EDuc. 251, 254 (1975); Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychologi-
cal Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 93, 119-37; Comment, Anxiety and the
First Semester of Law School, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1201, 1203. The invocation of Socrates'
name was varied somewhat by Dean Casper, who remarked of Harry Kalven that he "was a
law teacher who did not teach by 'the Socratic method,' but who was a Socrates." Dedica-
tion to Harry Kalven, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. (1975).
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method is meant seriously, there is all the more reason to examine
the term with care.
The central thesis of this essay is that legal education can best
be described in terms of the paideia2 offered by Socrates' great
rival, the Sophist Protagoras, and not in terms of that offered by
Socrates himself. The negative point must be established first: le-
gal education has lived for so long off the favorable connotations of
Socrates' name that a reasoned argument must be given showing
why the Socratic analogy is inappropriate.3 The first half of the
essay will therefore offer a definition of the actual method of in-
struction employed in legal education, and will then show why it is
inaccurate to speak of this as Socratic.
The second half of the essay establishes the analogy with
Protagorean paideia. It is surprising that this parallel has not been
considered before, for it was the Sophists, and not Socrates, who
trained the advocates of fifth and fourth century Athens.4 It was
Protagoras, though, who also laid the pedogogical foundations for
2. It is difficult to capture the full flavor of the Greek term tat eC (a. In only a rough
sense can this be translated as "education," for the Greeks assigned a broader meaning to
7cathe fa than we would to "education." As Professor Jaeger has noted, ae Lbe (C is closer
in meaning to the German Bildung than it is to any single English word. See W. JAEGER, 1
PAmEasI: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE xxiii (1939). It thus refers to the method by which
the values of a civilization are instilled in an individual and not to the method by which any
one specific skill is taught. It is in this sense that Plato proposes a system of 7ta tbe (a in
the Republic (see, e.g., Republic 376E and passim) and also in this sense that Socrates
spoke of education and a sense of justice as marks of the noble character (see, e.g., Gorgias
470E).
3. One exception to this must be noted. Professors Shaffer and Redmount have claimed
that "the first year of law school is an exercise in intimidation. . . [and that] [I]aw teachers
have traditionally called this method of intimidation 'Socratic."' They have then argued
that "Socrates would decline the honor of being identified with [the method]." See T. SHAF-
R & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAw STUDENTrs AND PEOPLE 8 (1977). The authors certainly
stand alone in questioning the propriety of calling the method "Socratic"; but their reason
for doing so is, unfortunately, of doubtful validity. It is clear that Socrates did intimidate
his students. The most famous example of this is to be found at Meno 8OA-B where Meno,
in expressing frustration over Socrates' questioning, states that he believes Socrates to be
"exercising magic and witchcraft over" him. (Guthrie trans.) For a compilation of instances
of slyness in Socrates' questioning of others, see R. ROBINSON, PLATO'S EARLIER DIALECTIc 7-
10 (2d ed., 1953) [hereinafter cited as R. ROBINSON].
4. For general discussions of the pedagogical role of the Sophists in training Athenian
advocates, see R. BONNER, LAWYERs AND LrGANTS IN ANciNT ATHENS, Ch. 8 (1927); and J.
JONES, THE LAW AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE GREEKS 146-49 (1956). The legal education of-
fered by the Sophists is treated satirically in Aristophanes' Clouds (Arrowsmith trans.). For
further discussion of the Sophists' instruction of advocates, see text & accompanying notes
48-61 infra.
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the chicanery Plato faulted in the Sophists5 - and this may ex-
plain both why the parallel between Sophistic and legal education
has been ignored and why that parallel is a disturbing, and highly
relevant, one today. The second half of the essay will thus have a
double purpose. It will demonstrate the strength of the analogy
with the Sophists and, in doing so, it will consider the troubling
implications that follow from the analogy.
I. LAw SCHOOL SOCRATIC METHOD
What is it law professors mean when they claim to teach by
"Socratic method"? Two aspects of this claim deserve particular
attention. First, law schools' Socratic instruction consists of a pro-
cess of question and answer in which students are pressed by their
professors to state and then to clarify basic concepts of the law.
The source of these concepts is not merely a student's imagina-
tion-a student is not asked, for instance, what he means by a con-
tract or by due process of law. Instead, the legal ideas at stake are
contained in a case, and a professor's questioning is designed to
lead students to recognize the shadings of a concept's meaning im-
plicit in the text of a case. Law school Socratic method can, in this
way, be defined as a form of eristical criticism of texts-"critical"
because of the centrality of textual analysis in the curriculum and
"eristical" because question and answer, rather than some form of
lecture, are used to reach valid interpretations of the legal rules of
a case. Textual criticism is of course not the sole component of
legal education; it often yields to speculation about novel applica-
tions of a rule or to consideration of fact-patterns the author of a
decision appeared not to have anticipated. However, even when
this occurs, textual criticism remains centrally important, for it
discovers the theme (the rule) which can then be subjected to in-
finite variation.
It was Dean Langdell of Harvard who first introduced this
5. In the Protagorean curriculum, students were taught to develop both sides of an
argument. In this respect, they were taught how "to make the weaker cause the stronger."
See H. DIELS, 2 FRAGMENTE DER VoRsoKRATncER 266, No. 6b (1952) [hereinafter cited as
DxELs], trans. by K. FREas, as ANcj.A TO THE PPESOCRAnC PHMOSOPHERS 126, No. 6b
(1971). Socrates in turn faulted Sophists who offered instruction in forensic oratory as "ped-
dler[s] of the goods by which a soul is nourished." Protagoras 313C (Guthrie trans.). For




method of eristical criticism to American legal education." As far as
can be determined, it was also Langdell who first called the
method "Socratic."' 7 Because the techniques of legal education
have not changed significantly in the hundred years or so since
Langdell's revolution (a matter of consternation for some and sat-
isfaction for others8), we can use an account of Langdell's own ap-
proach to teaching as a basic description of the procedures under-
lying law school Socratic method. More will have to be said about
the purposes of these procedures, but the elements of the instruc-
tional technique itself are stated well in the following description:
Langdell began his [classroom instruction] by having each of the cases, which
the students had to study carefully in preparation for the class, briefly ana-
lyzed by one of them with respect to the facts and the law contained in it. He
then added a series of questions, which were so arranged as gradually to lay
bare the entire law contained in that particular case. This stimulated ques-
tions, doubts, and objections on the part of individual students, against
whom the teacher had to hold his own ground in reply. Teacher and pupils
then, according to Langdell's design, work together unremittingly to extract
from the single cases and from the combination or contrasting of cases their
entire legal content, so that in the end those principles of that particular
branch of law which control the entire mass of related cases are made clear.
The two ideas taken together [statement of the case and debate over its
principles] suggest and are sufficiently well described by the term "Socratic
method," - an expression which was indeed early employed by Langdell and
his pupils."
The text-based character of law school Socratic method is not
a matter of dispute. Its purpose has, however, been a subject of
intense controversy. In recent years, critics of legal education have
argued that an unstated purpose of its Socratic method has been
to impose an oppressive, patriarchal domination on law students.10
Defenders in turn have pointed to a more benign purpose, claiming
that the method is designed merely to teach students to think like
6. See Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, 5 PERSPEanvES IN
AM. HIST. 405, 427 (1971); and REDLICH, supra note 1, at 9-13.
7. See J. REDLICH, supra note 1, at 12.
8. Dean Michael Kelly of the University of Maryland Law School has noted, largely in
disappointment, that "[l]aw schools have refused to expand the basic limits set by Lang-
dell" in 1870. KELLY, LEGAL ETHIcS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 24 (1980). See also Richardson,
supra note 1, at 435. For an account of what Stevens calls the triumph of "Harvard ortho-
doxy," see Stevens, supra note 6, at 424-41.
9. J. REDLICH, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 1, at 72-73; Savoy, supra note 1, at 457; Watson,
supra note 1, at 119-25; and T. SHTsmn & R. REDMOuNT, supra note 3, at 8.
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lawyers.11 Although no one seems to have noted the possibility,
both sides could be correct. Arguably, the threat of domination en-
courages rigorous analysis; and law school might, in this sense, of-
fer yet another example of the beneficial effect of suffering. For the
purposes of this essay, though, the accuracy of each side's argu-
ment is largely irrelevant. If the warrant to use Socrates' name is
to be challenged successfully-if, in other words, the conclusions
reached here are to be credible beyond a small circle of dissenters
who would be predisposed to believe them in any case-legal edu-
cation must be taken on its most, not its least, favorable terms.
Only orthodox accounts of law school Socratic method will there-
fore be considered here.
When viewed from the standpoint of orthodoxy, the purpose
of the method is clear: it is designed to prepare students "to think
like lawyers" and, above all, to prepare them for their roles as ad-
vocates. Modern defenders of the method such as Edwin Patter-
son, for instance, have claimed that it offers "good preparation" for
the "ordeal" of courtroom debate with judges and lawyers.12 Simi-
larly, Warren Seavey, who was once singled out for his ability to
"out-Seavey Socrates," 13 was praised for using the method to train
his students in the fine arts of "splitting a hair" and "distinguish-
ing a distinction."1 And Louis Brandeis, an early defender of the
method, apparently hoped that it would induce even more than a
capacity to make fine distinctions. Brandeis claimed that law
school Socratic method raises each student's interest to a "fever
heat" and that "[t]he animated discussions in the class-room in-
duce the student to every means of fortifying himself, either for his
own instruction or in order to overthrow his adversary in discus-
sion, be it professor or fellow student.,1 5
Brandeis' remarks underscore the uniquely adaptive purpose
defenders have discerned in law school Socratic method. When
11. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 1, at 19. John Chipman Gray offered the following
defense of Langdell's method: "To extract law from the facts is the thing that a lawyer has
to do all his life; to do it well makes the successful lawyer; to do it pre-eminently well makes
the great lawyer; a student cannot begin it too early." Gray, Methods of Legal Education, 1
YALE L.J. 159, 161 (1892).
12. Patterson, supra note 1, at 19.
13. Keeton, supra note 1, at 1333.
14. Hall, Warren Seavey and the Age of Restatement, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1329, 1330,
quoting HARV. L. D. REc., April 28, 1955.
15. Brandeis, The Harvard Law School, 1 THE GREEN BAG 1, 21 (1889).
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students are urged to "overthrow" their opponents in argument or
when they are encouraged to debate with their professors as if the
latter were appellate judges, they are being trained in exactly the
processes of thought they will later employ as lawyers. Instruction
in legal doctrine cannot offer this training by itself; law professors
have long recognized this point and so have placed greater empha-
sis on learning to think like a lawyer than on legal doctrine. Law
school Socratic method thus provides the context and also sets the
standard for successful acquisition of the lawyer's mental
processes. There is, in this sense, a continuum of means and ends10
in legal education; for unlike some other systems where pedagogi-
cal method is employed to impart a specific body of information, in
this case the end of education is acquisition of the means by which
the education is imparted. Thus, when a student can "split a hair"
or "distinguish a distinction," he not only reflects the instructional
method of eristical textual criticism, he also shows that he has
made this method his own.
II. NOT SOCRATES
When we turn to the method of the historical Socrates, a
problem of interpretation immediately arises, for it is hard to be
sure of the accuracy of descriptions of the teaching methods of a
man who left no writings. Protagoras poses a similar problem since
he left only a few fragments. For the purposes of this essay, these
problems are not insurmountable. Plato's early dialogues 17 have
long been taken as the chief guide to Socratic method. They will
play the same role here and will be supplemented occasionally by
references to Socrates in the writings of Xenophon 18 and Aris-
16. This term is taken from the title of Chapter 6 of J. DEWEY, THEORY OF VALUATION
(1939).
17. This essay follows Richard Robinson's list of Plato's early dialogues. This list can
be found at the OXFORD CLASSICAL DICIONARY 842 (2nd ed., 1970). It consists of Hippias
Minor, Laches, Charmides, Ion, Protagoras, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Gorgias, Meno,
Lysis, and Euthydemus. In another work, Robinson treats Book I of Republic as a Socratic
dialogue, so this should be added to the list. See ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 9.
18. Xenophon, a contemporary of Plato's, discussed Socrates in four of his works, the
Oeconomicus, Apologia, Symposium, and Memorabilia. Of these, the last is by far the most
significant for any discussion of Socratic method. See, e.g., W. GUTHRIE, SOCRATES 13-28
(1971) [hereinafter cited as SOcRATEs]; and Wellman, Socratic Method in Xenophon, 37 J.
OF THE HST. OF IDEAS 307 (1976).
[Vol. 29404
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totle.19 Plato's Protagoras, a dialogue between Socrates and the
Sophist that may actually have occurred in about 430 B.C.,20 offers
the most extensive available description of the latter and his views.
In the case of Protagoras, though, reliance will be placed on, ad-
mittedly opaque, fragments of his writings21 and on references to
him in other Platonic dialogues22 and in Diogenes Laertius's Lives
of the Philosophers.28
A second general point deserves consideration. Eristical de-
bate, which was one of the great Greek contributions to Western
civilization and which also lies at the heart of modern legal educa-
tion, rose to the level of a self-conscious art (Protagoras called it a
.TeXv 24) under the stewardship of Protagoras and Socrates. If
Socratic method were defined solely in terms of a process of
teachers' questions and students' answers, then Protagoras'
method would be indistinct from that of Socrates'. Both men em-
ployed pedagogical techniques that can properly be called dialecti-
cal as well as eristical.25 (The special philosophical meanings of
"dialectic" that Plato introduced in his later dialogues such as the
Republic26 and the Sophist7 are refinements of a term that had a
19. Aristotle has been particularly influential in directing posterity's attention to Socra-
tes' intellectualist approach to morality. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 1144b19 and 28, and
Eudemian Ethics 1216b2ff. For arguments that Aristotle is generally correct in his summa-
ries of Socrates' ideas, see Field, Aristotle's Account of the Historical Origin of the Theory
of Ideas, 17 CLASSICAL Q. 113 (1923); and Ross, The Problem of Socrates, 30 PROC. OF THE
CLASSICAL A. 7, 18 (1933).
20. This conclusion is reached by J.S. Morrison in his article, The Place of Protagoras
in Athenian Public Life (460-415 B.C.), 35 CLASSICAL Q. 1, 2 (1941). Morrison lists three
reasons for placing the dialogue in 433 B.C. Among these are the relative ages of Protagoras
and Socrates. At Protagoras 317C, Protagoras states that he could be the father of all those
in the room, including Socrates. Using birth dates given by others for Protagoras and Socra-
tes, Morrison narrows the possible time for the dialogue to the 430's and then uses other
evidence contained in the dialogue to settle on 433.
21. These are to be found at 2 DIELs, supra note 5, at 266-68 and K. FREEMAN, supra
note 5, at 125-27.
22. These are to be found at Euthydemus 286C-D, Meno 91E, and, most importantly,
Theaetetus 152Aff.
23. Diogenes, a writer of the third century A.D., is a notoriously unreliable source of
information about ancient philosophers. He will therefore be cited only to corroborate
claims made elsewhere. For his writings on Protagoras, see 2 DIOGENEs LAERTIUS, LIVEs OF
THE EMINENT PHmosOPEmw 50-56 (Hicks trans. 1925).
24. See 2 DIELS, supra note 5, at 266, No. 6 and K. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 126, No.
6.
25. See H. MARou, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN ANTIQUITY 51-52 (Lamb trans. 1956).
26. The key to the Platonic transformation of Socratic dialectic lies in the development
of Plato's theory of ideas. In Book VI of the Republic, Plato has Socrates speak of the
1980]
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looser meaning in the time of Protagoras and Socrates.) Similarly,
both men helped to popularize question and answer as a method of
education.28 And, in this sense, both men can be said to have
helped channel the spirit of the Olympic agon into the realm of
language,29 thus helping to institutionalize the long-standing Greek
love of debate.
Viewed from the level of Athenian popular culture, Protagoras
and Socrates were in fact often indistinguishable. Aristophanes, for
instance, makes Socrates the butt of his jokes in the Clouds, but
does so by attributing to him doctrines that are Protagorean, not
Socratic, in nature.3 0 Socrates in turn makes an indirect reference
to the Clouds in the Apology when he denies that he ever taught
the Protagorean technique of making the weaker argument the
stronger.31 Even fifty years after Socrates' death, when educated
Athenians were generally aware of Xenophon's and Plato's efforts
to distinguish Socrates from his rivals, one still finds Aeschines,
"power of dialectic" as enabling philosophers to ascend from ,hypotheses to an intellectual
plateau "which requires no assumptions and is the starting point of all." Republic 6. 51IB-C
(Shorey trans.). In Book VII, the ascent is said to reach the hypostatic entity that Plato's
Socrates calls the "good in itself." Republic 7. 532A-B (Shorey trans.). While the exact con-
tribution of Socrates to Plato's theory of ideas is not certain, it is safest to assume that
Socrates did not offer a comprehensive theory of forms as transcendent entities, such as the
theory found in Books VI and VII of the Republic. If this is true, then Socrates could also
not be said to have employed the approach to dialectic used there.
27. In the Sophist, Plato offers an alternative version of dialectic that employs a
spokesman other than Socrates and that anticipates some of the features of Aristotle's ap-
proach to classification. Dialectic here is st UM concerned with transcendent realities; in this
respect, Plato differs with Aristotle. However, the distinctions made by dialectic involve
division and collection, with the master of dialectic being able to distinguish "Kind by Kind,
in what ways the several Kinds can or can not combine." Sophist 253D-E (Cornford trans.).
See also Sophist 226Cff.
28. See generally H. MARROu, supra note 25, Chap. 5. Ernest Barker has also reminded
us in this regard that "[i]n contrasting Socrates with the Sophists, we must remember that
in many respects, he was one of them." E. BARKER, POLMCAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARis-
TOTLE 46 (1959).
29. This is the argument of A. GoLnm, ENTER PLATO Chap. 2 (1965).
30. At lines 112-18, Strepsiades informs his son that there are two kinds of logic, "phil-
osophical" logic and "Sophistic or Socratic" logic. William Arrowsmith noted that the origi-
nator of the Doctrine of the Two Logics (or Antilogoi) was Protagoras of Abdera. Aristo-
phanes, CLOUDS 117 (Arrowsmith trans. 1962). At lines 1399ff, Pheidippides, Strepsiades'
son, gives a classic illustration of how to make the weaker cause the stronger by "prov[ing]
beyond the shadow of a doubt the philosophical propriety of beating my Father." (Arrow-
smith trans.)
31. Socrates' Defense (Apology) 18B. (Tredennick trans.) It should be noted that Soc-
rates was also mistakenly charged with teaching the doctrines of Anaxagoras. See id. 26D.
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Demosthenes' great opponent in oratory, classifying Socrates as a
Sophist and thus underscoring the strength of popular prejudice.3 2
Thus, if we were to confine our analysis to the level of popular
culture, the eristical method of question and answer could be
called either Protagorean or Socratic-although even here Protago-
ras would deserve the nod on grounds of historical precedence.ss
However, if we examine the specific features of each man's educa-
tional technique, the differences between them become stark in-
deed, with Protagoras foreshadowing modern legal education and
Socrates creating a system of moral education peculiarly his own.
The two criteria just used to define law school Socratic method can
now be applied to Socrates and Protagoras. Inquiry will start with
Socrates, examining first the purpose of his method and then the
procedures it employed. Once the negative analogy with Socrates
has been established, these same criteria will be used to establish
the positive analogy with Protagoras.
Consider first the purpose of Socratic method. It is appropri-
ate to begin discussion with this point, for examination of the telos
of an object was Socrates' own favored approach to definition.u
The purpose of Socratic method was frankly ethical. Socrates
made this clear in the Apology, where, addressing his Athenian
jurors, he said:
Gentlemen ... I owe a greater obedience to God than to you, and so long as
I draw my breath and have my faculties, I shall never stop practicing philoso-
phy and exhorting you and elucidating the truth for everyone that I meet. I
shall go on saying, in my usual way, My very good friend, you are an Athe-
nian and belong to a city which is the greatest and most famous in the world
for its wisdom and strength. Are you not ashamed that you give your atten-
tion to acquiring as much money as possible, and similarly with reputation
and honor, and give no attention or thought to truth and understanding and
the perfection of your soul [JuXi]?
And if any of you disputes this and professes to care about these things, I
32. Aeschines, Against Timarchus 173.
33. See generally note 20, supra. Morrison offers good reasons for supposing that Pro-
tagoras began his public career in Athens no later than 453 B.C., at which time Socrates
would only have been in his teens. See Morrison, supra note 20, at 5.
34. See, e.g., Cratylus 389A-C and Republic 353B. The former is admittedly not clas-
sified as an early, Socratic dialogue; see note 17 supra. However, as Guthrie remarks, the
passage cited offers a typically Socratic teleological approach to definition, one that Socrates
does employ in dialogues such as Book I of the Republic that are considered "Socratic." See
SocRATEs supra note 18, at 122.
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shall not at once let him go or leave him. No, I shall question him and ex-
amine him and test him; and if it appears that in spite of his profession he
has made no real progress toward goodness, I shall reprove him for neglecting
what is of extreme importance, and giving his attention to trivialities.35
With this speech, Socrates made clear the purpose of his eris-
tical duels. For him, question and answer were a means of awaken-
ing his students to ethical truth. Once this truth was known, he
claimed, in a doctrine that has been widely challenged because of
its intellectualist approach to human conduct, 6 it could by itself
induce men to act virtuously. Plato's Socratic dialogues point to-
ward two related doctrines of ethics and epistemology-that virtue
is knowable and thus teachable,3 and that knowledge of the nature
of virtue is a necessary and sufficient condition for engaging in
right conduct.3 8 These propositions remain unproven throughout
the Socratic dialogues. In fact, Socrates frequently confessed he
did not know what virtue (ap -j) is;39 and the exact meaning of
Socratic "knowledge" 40 remains uncertain. Such difficulties lie at
the root of Socrates' repeated confessions of ignorance. They
should not, however, cause any doubt about the overall purpose of
35. Apology 29D-30A (Tredennick trans.).
36. Aristotle was the first, and most influential challenger of Socrates' doctrine of virtue
as a type of knowledge. See his Nicomachean Ethics 1144b25ff. and other sources cited at
note 19 supra.
37. Aristotle argues that this was Socrates' belief. See Nicomachean Ethics 1144b28ff.
Socrates argues extensively for the knowability, and thus the teachability, of virtue at Meno
89Cff. where he states, "If ... virtue is knowledge, clearly it is teachable." (Guthrie trans.)
However, his entire argument in the Meno is framed in hypothetical terms, and he finally
concludes that virtue is not knowledge because there are no teachers of it. Meno 98E, This
is undoubtedly a case of Socratic irony directed at the Sophists, for Socrates presents him-
self as a teacher of virtue at Apology 30A, although he of course never makes any claim to
know what virtue is. See also Xenophon Memorabilia 3.9.5. (Marchant trans.).
38. At Gorgias 460B, Socrates claims that, by his principle, "he who has learned justice
is just." (Woodhead trans.) This is cited by Aristotle at Eudemian Ethics 1216b6 as a genu-
ine Socratic doctrine. Xenophon attributes the same claim to Socrates at Memorabilia 4.6.6
where he has Socrates argue that (a) when one knows what he ought to do, one cannot
believe that one should do otherwise and (b) no one does other than what he thinks he
ought to do.
39. See, e.g., Apology 23A-B; Meno 71B; and Charmides 165B.
40. In fact, "knowledge" is a translator's umbrella term that has been used to stand for
cit %Li and crotta. For virtue as eair itljt1, see Protagoras 352C, 361C and Meno
87C. For virtue as coy ta, see Xenophon Memorabilia 3.9.5. E.R. Dodds has noted that the
Greeks often used the term eitf'p to denote practical skill and trained ability. E.
DODDs, THE GREEKs AND m IRRATiONAL 16ff (1951). Given this meaning of "knowledge,"
Socrates may not have been suggesting that mere understanding of the nature of virtue is a
necessary and sufficient condition for engaging in virtuous conduct.
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his project. Socrates admitted only to ignorance of the nature of
virtue; he did not, however, express doubt that discovery of its
nature would induce men to act rightly. His dialogues therefore
aimed at the discovery of elusive ethical knowledge, since this, by
Socratic reckoning, was the key to moral reform.
The Socratic dialogue was therefore a particularly appropriate
way of carrying out his reformist mission. One of the reasons for
this lies in his moral epistemology. Another reason, though, is to be
found in the special role Socrates assigned to the soul ('uX') as
repository of ethical knowledge. According to Socrates, learning is
a form of recollection by which a student recovers from his soul
knowledge he has always possessed but of which he was, for one
reason or another, no longer consciously aware.41 The eristic dia-
logue in turn is the means by which recollection takes place, with
the teacher's questions laying the foundation for penetrating barri-
ers of forgetfulness to aid the student in recovering the.ethical
knowledge contained in his soul. A famous example of this anames-
tic process is to be found in Socrates' examination of the slave boy
in the Meno. After establishing that his pupil had no special train-
ing in the subject under discussion, Socrates extracted from the
student basic propositions the student had originally believed him-
self incapable of enunciating. Socrates' conclusion at the end of the
lesson indicates the connection between questioning and recollec-
tion which underlies his own eristic dialogues: "So a man who does
not know has in himself true opinions on a subject without having
knowledge .... This knowledge will not come from teaching but
from questioning. He [the subject of the questioning] will recover
it for himself."'42
Thus, not only were Socrates' dialogues aimed at moral re-
form, his actual procedures were based on a special conception of
the way in which reform could be brought about by awakening the
soul to ethical knowledge. By themselves, these points would not
suffice to invalidate the analogy between Socratic method and that
of legal education. It remains possible, after all, that law professors
employ Socrates' eristical techniques while not endorsing the pur-
41. The concept of learning as recollection is introduced at Phaedo 76Aff. as well as
Meno 81Eff. Since the former is definitely not considered an early dialogue, discussion has
been confined to the latter. For a review of the doctrine, see Moravcsik, Learning as Recol-
lection in PLATO E: METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 53 (G. Vlastos ed. 1971).
42. Meno 85C-D (Guthrie trans.).
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poses for which he used them.4' However, it should be recalled that
the purpose of law school Socratic method has been an important
issue in the debate between dissenters from and defenders of legal
education, and that the latter have defined a purpose strikingly
different from that of Socrates. Furthermore, it should also be re-
called that Socrates' approach to definition was teleological; thus,
if we are to define his and law schools' method of instruction by his
own lights, purpose becomes an unavoidable issue. Considered in
this way, Socratic method can be said to bear a mild resemblance
to certain contemporary systems of moral education. Legal educa-
tion, though, is certainly not one of these; its stated purposes are
fundamentally at odds with those of Socrates. Given the impor-
tance that both Socrates and law professors have accorded to the
purposes of their respective systems, this.difference appears to be a
significant one.
An alternative, and perhaps looser, approach to definition
might therefore be appropriate. If one were to ignore both the pur-
pose of Socratic method and its theory of learning as recollection,
one might argue for an analogy between legal and Socratic educa-
tion on the basis of the procedures each employs. Beyond the su-
perficial similarity of eristic questioning, though, the argument for
analogy fails. According to law school Socratic method, a professor
takes a case as the basis of instruction and then asks students to
elucidate its meaning. By contrast, Socrates was determinedly hos-
tile to textual analysis of any kind. A revealing example of this
hostility can be found in Plato's account of Socrates' debate with
Protagoras himself. There, when the latter was asked to inaugurate
a topic of discussion, he took as his text two sections of a poem by
Simonides and proposed to examine these for their consistency
with one another." At first, Socrates participated in this discus-
sion. But when asked to initiate a topic of his own, he began by
remarking bitingy that conversations about others' writings re-
minded him of talk amongst "second-rate and commonplace peo-
ple." "The best people," he said, "avoid such discussions, and en-
tertain each other from their own resources, testing one another's
mettle... .It is the truth, and our own minds, that we should be




testing."45 Socrates' point was unmistakable: in a dialogue that he
initiated, no text would be allowed to come between him and his
students since this would distract them from the search for ethical
knowledge. This point in turn underscores the relation of anamne-
sis (recollection) and Socratic questioning. Socrates' questions were
designed to awaken students to knowledge they already had-thus
his hostility to intervening texts. Law professors' questions, by
contrast, are meant to stimulate reflection on texts, not to aid stu-
dents in developing their own a priori beliefs. For legal education,
then, eristic furthers the goal of textual criticism. For Socratic
paideia, on the other hand, textual criticism can only impede the
anamnestic goal of eristic. This consideration alone is sufficient to
demonstrate the profound difference between the two systems.
However, one more procedure should be cited in order to em-
phasize the lack of analogy. As Richard Robinson has pointed out,
Socrates asked for definitions (of virtue, justice, courage, etc.),
framing these requests in one of two forms.48 In one, Socrates
asked for a definition of one thing in terms of another ("is x y?");
and in the other, Socrates asked directly what a thing is ("what is
x?").47 Thus, in defining justice, a student of Socrates would not be
permitted to give an example of a just relation among men. In-
stead, he would be required to state the basic characteristic
(E LTog) of justice itself. Here, as in the previous discussion of
Socrates' hostility to textual analysis, it is hard to disentangle Soc-
rates' ontological presuppositions from the constituent elements of
his method. However, a substitution of "abstract" for "essentialist"
definition may suffice in this case. But even if this substitution is
made, how could it possibly be said that law professors set as an
educational goal the production of abstract definitions of key legal
terms? And, furthermore, could it be said that professors pursue
such definitions by renouncing textual criticism, instead having
their students answer questions solely by reference to their own
concepts of law? Unless both questions are answered affirmatively,
law professors cannot accurately be characterized as employing
45. Id. 347C (Guthrie trans.).
46. R. ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 49.
47. Id. at 50, citing Meno 72C and Euthyphro 6D. It should be noted that while Soc-
rates employs the term c !bog in both these passages and thus clearly rejects the kind of
ostensive definitions offered by his students, this does not mean that he was committed to
metaphysical characteristics of etbog that one finds in Plato's middle and later dialogues.
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even the procedures of Socratic method. Law schools' own Socratic
method can succeed at its own tasks only by ignoring the method
of Socrates himself.
Actually, one must go a step further than this: if law profes-
sors were to employ the educational methods of Socrates, then
they would violate the fundamental norms of their profession.
However strong the current interest in moral issues surrounding
professional responsibility may be, law professors are not permit-
ted to use their classrooms to carry out direct moral instruction of
their students. Furthermore, even if the ethical purpose underlying
Socratic method were to be discounted, it must be remembered
that law professors do not, as a rule, set aside textual criticism in
favor of the pursuit of abstract definitions of basic concepts of law.
The term "Socratic method" may therefore serve as a flattering
conceit for professors of law, but it bears little similarity to the
method of Socrates.
III. BUT PROTAGORAS
Not Socrates, then, but why Protagoras? The answer is that
the same criteria employed to demonstrate the lack of analogy be-
tween Socratic and legal education can now be used to forge one
when the Sophists are substituted for Socrates.
However, before turning to specific points of convergence, it
would be wise to consider a general one that arises out of the
Sophists' pedagogical role in ancient Greece. Within the limits set
by their own milieu, the Sophists can be singled out as the first
group in Athens to have created a market in either legal represen-
tation or instruction in the law. Two limits are, however, signifi-
cant. One was the Athenian prohibition against direct representa-
tion of litigants.48 Absolute as this prohibition may theoretically
have been, in practice it was subject to certain exceptions, and it
was through the exploitation of these exceptions that the Sophists
first established their position in Athens. A litigant could claim, for
instance, that he was unprepared for trial or that he was too ill to
speak. With the permission of the court, he could then substitute a
48. This is discupsed at R. BONNER, supra note 4, at 135; G. CALHOUN, GREEK LEGAL




"friend" or relation to speak for him.49 Or, if the litigant wished to
avoid such a ruse, he could hire a Sophist to serve as a logographos
in writing a speech for him to deliver on his own. ° Whichever role
the Sophist played, as either direct or indirect advocate, his very
presence provoked alarm. Athenians in general and Socrates in
particular were troubled by what they perceived as the introduc-
tion of market principles into the previously sacred domain of jus-
tice. In the Clouds, Aristophanes used the comic figure of Strep-
siades to express alarm over the new moral brokerage. There, he
had Strepsiades remark breathlessly to his son: "My boy, that little
hovel is the Thinkery. Intellectuals live there .... What's
more-for a fee, of course-they offer a course called The Tech-
nique of Winning Lawsuits. Honest or dishonest, it's all one."51
Another limit on legal instruction was not so easily circum-
vented, though. The Athenians restricted the power of the judici-
ary, giving to the juries of their various courts the authority to
make determinations of both law and fact.52 The purpose of these
allocations of power was to prevent the corresponding growth of a
corps of legal specialists who, it was feared, would threaten the
foundations of democratic government. 3 Unlike the rule on legal
representation, this limitation on the power of the judiciary was
apparently honored throughout the fifth century. Its effect was to
encourage Sophistic instructors to place primary emphasis on fo-
rensic technique, since this was more likely than citations of the
law to be decisive in the outcome of a suit. This is not to say the
Sophists were uninterested in legal doctrine. Protagoras, for in-
stance, drafted at Pericles' request a legal code for the Athenian-
sponsored colony of the Thurii.5 Antiphon, one of the great ora-
tors of the fifth century, reviewed some of the basic Athenian laws
of homicide in display speeches that stated first the prosecution's
49. G. CALHOUN, supra note 48, at 44-45; A. HARRISON, supra note 48, at 158; J. JONES,
supra note 4, at 144-45.
50. G. CALHOUN, supra note 48, at 39; A. HARRiSON, supra note 48, at 157.
51. Aristophanes Clouds 94-99 (Arrowsmith, trans.).
52. G. CALHOUN, supra note 48, at 35.
53. Id. at 47-48. For a discussion of the Athenian failure to develop a body of system-
atic law, see J. JONES, supra note 4, at 292-308.
54. See Ehrenberg, The Foundation of the Thurii, 69 AM. J. OF PHILOLOGY 149, 168
(1948). For an example of Protagoras' interest in legal theory, see Plutarch, Life of Pericles
36, in PLUTARCH'S Lwvs where Plutarch recounts a debate between Pericles and Protagoras
over the responsibility assignable to a javelin thrower who had accidentally hit another per-
son with his weapon while participating in an athletic contest.
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argument and then the defense's; 5 and Isaeus, an orator of the
fourth century, serves as a similar source of information for the
rules governing inheritance.5 6 However, despite the personal inter-
est of some of the Sophists in Athenian law, as teachers they were
more concerned with forensic technique than with substantive law.
Such emphasis was appropriate, of course, in a legal system that
accorded little authority to its judiciary. Because of the emphasis
on forensic technique, though, the analogy with modern legal edu-
cation must be considered an imperfect one. Sophistic paideia laid
the foundations for the eristical instruction of advocates. It did
not, however, link this with legal doctrine as have law schools of
the present day.
When we turn to the purposes of Protagoras' instruction (since
"purpose" was the first criterion used to assess Socratic method)
we begin to encounter the darker side of Sophistic thought. Pro-
tagoras' own fragments offer a good illustration of this since they
hint strongly at the special pleasure that Sophists, like modern ad-
vocates, took in the game of debate itself. In his treatise on the Art
of Eristics, for instance, Protagoras told students there are two
contradictory arguments about everything.57 Pedagogically, this
claim was probably connected with the eristical exercises contained
in his Antilogiae, where students were required first to take one
position on an assigned subject and then to refute it.55 The most
significant of Protagoras' fragments, though, is one that defines the
55. The authorship of the Tetralogies, in which these countervailing arguments are out-
lined, is uncertain. Kenneth Maidment, translator of the Tetralogies for the Loeb Classical
Library, has argued that they cannot be attributed to Antiphon, although they commonly
are. See 1 MINOR ATric ORATORs 12 (K. Maidment trans. and ed. 1941). To use the termi-
nology of the modern legal system, Antiphon is listed here as author "for identification pur-
poses only."
56. See IsAEus x, xii-xiii (E. Forster trans. and ed. 1927).
57. 2 DIELs, supra note 5, at 266, No. 6; K. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 126, No. 6.
58. 2 DIELs, supra note 5, at 265, No. 1; K. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 125, No. 1. The
full title of Protagoras' treatise was ANTIAOPON A 9. Aristotle appears to have endorsed
this Protagorean method of instruction. At Topics 163a37ff, he offers the following advice to
students:
Always, in dealing with any proposition, be on the lookout for a line of argument
both pro and con: and on discovering it at once set about looking for the solution
for it: for in this way you will soon find that you have trained yourself at the
same time in both asking questions and answering them.
(Pickard-Cambridge trans.) Paul Moraux has noted the Protagorean basis of this portion of
the Topics. See Moraux, La joute dialectique d'apr~s le huiti~me livre des topiques in
ARISTOTLE ON DIALECTIc: THE Topics 277, 295 (G. Owen ed. 1968).
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special task of the advocate; this is the fragment in which he
enjoined his students to seek "to make the weaker cause [XWrov]
the stronger."59 The exact meaning of this dictum, which survives
without supporting comment, is hard to determine. It is possible
that Protagoras was concerned with arguments commonly viewed
as morally weaker than their opposites, and that he wished to show
that all moral statements are equally valid.e0 On the other hand, he
may not have been concerned with philosophical issues at all; he
may simply have wished to instill in his students the advocate's
"love of the chase." But whichever of these hypotheses is correct,
Protagoras' fragment on the weaker cause was used in a system of
instruction which separated forensic training from moral education
(if, indeed, the latter was offered at all), and which thus made vic-
tory in debate an important goal in its own right.61 In this respect,
Protagoras established a separate and distinct system of education
for advocates, one where the end of instruction was defined, not by
moral considerations, but by student acquisition of the eristical
method used by the teacher himself.
According to Plato, Socrates was among the first to discern the
potential for chicanery implicit in this kind of instruction. Protag-
oras was never attacked personally in Plato's dialogues,62 but Soc-
rates regularly expressed his scorn for Sophistic paideia, for legal
advocacy, and for the legal mind itself. Sophists, Plato claimed in a
non-Socratic dialogue, were "traders in the merchandise of the
soul."63 As teachers who remained value-neutral while showing
their students how to influence the courts on questions of right and
59. 2 DiELs, supra note 5, at 266, No. 6b; K. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 126, No. 6b.
60. At Euthydemus 286C-D, Protagoras is said to have claimed that it is impossible to
have a false opinion. This claim extends beyond moral statements, though it would obvi-
ously include them.
61. Protagoras' argument that it is impossible to have a false belief is consistent with
his dictum, reported at Theaetetus 152A, that "man is the measure of all things-alike of
things that are and of the not-being of things that are not" (Cornford trans.) There is an
obvious parallel between Protagoras' philosopliical relativism and his concern with advo-
cacy. However, there is no necessary connection between these two concerns, nor is there
any evidence in Plato's dialogues or elsewhere that Protagoras mixed philosophical and
forensic instruction. In fact, the two dialogues that deal extensively with Protagoras' doc-
trines, Protagoras and Theaetetus, avoid this mixture, with the former offering a general
introduction to Protagoras' methods of instruction and the latter an outline and critique of
his relativist beliefs.
62. In fact, Socrates remarks at Meno 91E that Protagoras' "reputation [was] consist-
ently high" throughout his career as a Sophist. (Guthrie trans.)
63. Sophist 224C-D (Comford trans.).
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wrong, they were, according to Socrates in the Protagoras, "ped-
dler[s] of the goods by which a soul is nourished. ' 64 Advocacy, Soc-
rates argued, defeats, rather than furthers, the aims of justice; 5 in
the Gorgias, Socrates even claimed that it is immoral for an advo-
cate to defend a man whom he knows to be guilty.66 And, given
Socrates' general contempt for the legal mind,6 7 it should come as
no surprise to discover that he looked forward to the day when
lawyers would be exposed as intellectual frauds "and laughed at,
not by maid-servants or the uneducated . . . but by everyone
whose breeding is the antithesis of a slave's."68
Socrates' vituperation aside, can it actually be said that the
sole purpose of Protagorean paideia was to train students in the
arts of chicanery? Certainly many students acquired these as a by-
product of Sophistic instruction; and in this sense, Socrates should
be viewed not as the originator of the method of legal instruction
but instead as the first critic of the uses to which that method can
be put. But there is also a positive purpose, directed toward instil-
ling tolerance and respect for pluralism, which, on the one hand, is
discernible in Protagorean paideia and, on the other, is never men-
64. Protagoras 313C (Guthrie trans.).
65. Socrates would claim that there are two senses in which knowledge of the truth is a
necessary precondition for criminal justice. First, one must know the truth about a defen-
dant's condition. If a defendant is guilty, then this fact must be publicized as a first step
towards his rehabilitation. See Gorgias 480B-C (Woodhead trans.). Second, one must know
the true nature of justice, its elboG. It could be claimed that, in the modern world, we have
severed entirely the connection between truth and criminal justice. On the one hand, be-
cause of American law's emphasis on the procedural nature of justice, it could be said that a
criminal case reaches a just conclusion even though the truth about the defendant's conduct
is never publicized. On the other hand, it could also be argued, contra Socrates, that truth is
not possible in ethics and thus that one cannot know, but only feel, the validity of a stan-
dard of criminal justice.
66. Socrates claimed that there is a morally therapeutic power of punishment. He states
that a man who has done wrong should go to "the judge as though to a doctor [in order] to
prevent the distemper of evil from becoming ingrained and producing a festering and incur-
able ulcer in his soul." Gorgias 480A-B. As for the advocate who defends a man whom he
knows to be guilty, Socrates argued that the advocate "ought not to hide the evil away but
bring it to light in order that the culprit may be punished and regain his health." Id. at
480C.
67. At Theaetetus 172E-173A, Socrates remarks that the advocate "acquires a tense
and bitter shrewdness; he knows how to flatter a master and earn his good graces, but his
mind is narrow and crooked. An apprenticeship in slavery has dwarfed and twisted his
growth and robbed him of his free spirit, driving him into devious ways, threatening him
with fears and dangers which the tenderness of youth could not face with truth and honesty
." (Cornford trans.)
68. Id. at 175D (Corford trans.).
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tioned in Plato's assessments of it. This purpose has been a subject
of particular scholarly concern in recent years, for as a reaction
against the political implications of Platonism has set in, there has
been a corresponding tendency to revalue favorably Protagoras'
own tolerance for heterodoxy.6 One commentator has treated Pro-
tagoras as the advocate of an "open society" while Plato has then
been classed as the proponent of a "closed" one.70 Another has
even gone so far as to describe Protagoras as the inaugurator of a
"liberal temper" in Greek political thought.7 1 Both claims may be
as extreme in their way as are Plato's criticisms of the Sophists,
but it is not too much to say that Protagoras defines a characteris-
tic attitude of the advocate-skeptical, balanced, unburdened by
extensive philosophical commitments-in much the same way that
Socrates defines the attitude of the intellectual as moral reformer.
The advocate's approach to the world can of course degenerate
into amoralism; in this sense, Socrates and Plato remain useful
guides to the Sophists. However, the advocate's approach can also
be highly beneficial to a civilization that depends on open debate
of all sides of an issue; and it is here that the purpose of
Protagorean paideia is distinct from that of Socrates and meritori-
ous in its own right.
The analogy with legal education can be completed if we con-
sider the procedures by which Protagoras taught. Protagoras did
not confine himself to question and answer as a pedagogical de-
vice;72 but of course Socrates did not use this approach to the ex-
clusion of all others.73 However, there is good reason to suppose
69. W.K.C. Guthrie has summarized the trends in modern scholarship that have led to
a favorable valuation of the Sophists in general and Protagoras in particular. See W.
GUTHRiE, THE SOPHISTS, Chap. 1 (1973). This development has, to a certain degree, been
bound up with the democratic world's rejection of authoritarian government, the grounding
for which some commentators have found in Plato's political theory. See, e.g., W.TFITE, THE
PLATONIC LEGEND (1934); and 1 K. POPPER, THE OPEN SocIETY AND ITS ENEMEEs: THE SPELL
OP'PLATO (4th ed., 1963).
70. See K. POPPER, supra note 69, at 189. For an appraisal of Popper's argument, see
PLATO, POPPER AND POLITICS (R. Bambrough ed. 1967).
71. See E. HAVELOCK, THE LmERAL TEMPER IN GREEK POLITICS, Chap. 7 (1957).
72. In his dialogue with Socrates, for instance, he gave an extended speech on the origin
of human morals. See Protagoras 320C - 328C. Presumably, this was the kind of speech that
Protagoras gave to potential students in order to demonstrate his eloquence.
73. See, e.g., Socrates' discourses on the nature of the soul and immortality at Phaedo




that Protagoras placed higher value on question and answer than
on competing techniques. Plato attributes such a preference to him
in the Theaetetus.7 4 Furthermore, this is supported by Diogenes
Laertius, who states that Protagoras was the first to "institute con-
tests in debating [in order to teach] . . . the tricks of the trade."7 5
Eristical give and take was therefore Protagoras' preferred method
of instruction.
What is particularly intriguing about Protagoras, though, is
that he extended this question and answer approach to the analy-
sis of texts. Socrates, it will be recalled, concluded the debate over
Simonides' poem by rejecting the principle of text-based instruc-
tion, saying it was fit only for "second-rate and commonplace
people. ' 78 Protagoras, on the other hand, welcomed debate over
texts. That same exchange with Socrates concerning Simonides can
now be used to demonstrate why the analogy between Sophistic
and legal education is so apt.
The debate can be found in Plato's Protagoras. There, once
Socrates had completed his examination of Protagoras, the latter
was called upon to question him. Protagoras, as we know, selected
a poem by Simonides and asked Socrates to consider it with him.
First, Protagoras cited two passages from the poem, one where the
poet states that it is hard to become a good man, and another
where the poet disagrees with Pittacus' claim that it is hard to be
noble.7 7 Then, after having recited the passages, Protagoras asked
Socrates whether they were consistent with one another.7 8 Socra-
tes, who for once was cast as the respondent, replied he believed
they were, though in recounting the conversation to someone else,
he added that, in answering, he had feared, as any law student
might, that his interlocutor's interpretation of the text might be
the correct one.
74. Theaetetus 167D-E. There, in imagining a possible defense of Protagoras' methods
and doctrines, Socrates states the following as if Protagoras himself were speaking:
Now if you can dispute this doctrine in principle, do so by argument stating the
case for the other side, or by asking questions, if you prefer that method, which
has no terrors for a man of sense; on the contrary it ought to be specially agree-
able to him.
(Cornford trans., emphasis added).
75. DIOGENES LAERTIus, supra note 23, at 52-53 (Hicks trans.).
76. Protagoras 347C (Guthrie trans.). See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
77. Id. at 339B-C.
78. Id. at 339C.
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The subsequent exchange between Protagoras and Socrates
underscores the parallel between the Sophists' eristical textual
criticism and that of modern legal education:
How [Protagoras asked Socrates] can a man be thought consistent when he
says both these things? First he lays it down himself that it is hard for a man
to become truly good, then when he is a little further on in the same poem he
forgets. He finds fault with Pittacus, who said the same thing as he did him-
self, that it is hard to be noble, and refuses to accept it from him: but in
censuring the man who said the same as he does, he obviously censures him-
self. Either his first or his second statement is wrong.
This sally evoked praise and applause from many of the audience [Socrates is
reporting on events here; the dialogue Protagoras is in fact presented as a
narrative by Socrates to someone who did not attend the actual debate], and
at first I was like a man who has been hit by a good boxer; at his words and
the applause things went dark and I felt giddy."
Socrates' giddiness did not last for long. He parried by citing
the Eleatic distinction between being and becoming and thus tried
to save the poet from the charge of self-contradiction. Protagoras
in turn challenged the relevance of the distinction in this case, and
Socrates' and Protagoras' argument moved on to the question of
the meaning Simonides attached to the verb to "become."80 This
then raised other problems of meaning, and the debate became
even more technical as sources other than the poem were cited in
attempts to reconstruct the intended meaning of phrases such as
"hard to become" and "wrought without blame."81 Neither partici-
pant prevailed; the exchange, like many in law school, was far more
important for the opportunity it provided to exercise critical intel-
ligence than for the substantive conclusions it reached.82
In light of this special kind of debate over a text, perhaps it is
now possible to see how Protagoras employed such exchanges to
train his students in advocacy. Athenian statutes might have been
used in eristical instruction of this kind, but it is understandable
that they were not given their less than dispositive status in the
79. Id. at 339D-E (Guthrie trans.).
80. Id. at 339E-340E.
81. Id. at 340E-347A.
82. It is possible that Plato wanted the best of both worlds for Socrates. On the one
hand, he wanted to show that Socrates was the equal of Protagoras in textual analysis. On
the other hand, he had Socrates denigrate such analysis as the pastime of "second-rate and
commonplace people." Id. at 347C (Guthrie trans.). The latter point is the only one that is
consistent with dialogues initiated by Socrates.
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legal system itself.83 Instead, eristical exchanges over poetry, par-
ticularly exchanges over technically challenging poems like those of
Simonides, served as a better means of training advocates. The
structure of poetry could be extraordinarily complex, so its analy-
sis, when approached in Protagoras' morally neutral way, could
provide the kind of mental gymnastic needed by future advocates.
Furthermore, the citation of poetry had the potential to influence
the outcome of cases. Such influence would not -be likely in the
modern world. But in a non-technical legal system like that of Ath-
ens, poetry, while not a source of law, could have much the same
persuasive force that citation of dicta does today.8 4 Protagoras' use
of poetry was thus highly appropriate given the special conditions
of ancient Athens.
Both the procedures and purposes of Protagorean paideia are
analogous, then, with those of modern legal education. In particu-
lar, three parallels are discernible. First, a methodological point,
eristic lies at the heart of Protagorean paideia, just as it does in
legal education. Second for both systems, eristic is linked to tex-
tual analysis, with debate over a text being used to train future
advocates in the techniques of their profession. And third, for
both, the purpose of education can be defined by the eristical
method it employs. For Protagoras, as for law professors, the aim
of instruction is not to expose students to substantive points of
knowledge (although this is a byproduct of their training) but in-
stead to equip them with the technique by which instruction is
carried out. This is the feature of Sophistic and legal education
which has provoked qualms in outside observers, but it is also the
one that distinguishes both systems from Socrates' method of
83. J.W. Jones has remarked that throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, there was
"uncertainty. . .as to what laws were in force and [there were also] haphazard methods for
making an orderly arrangement of them." Furthermore, "not only the validity but also the
authenticity of what the pleaders adduced as laws continued to be questionable." Jones also
notes that at one time the Athenians even made it a crime punishable by death to cite a law
that did not exist. J. JoNES, supra note 4, at 115.
84. An instructive example is to be found at Aeschines' Against Timarchus 144-54. The
setting of Aeschines' speech was a trial for treason in which he was accuser and prosecutor.
There, after citing poetry by Homer and Euripides, Aeschines claimed that these poets en-
joined others to "make decisions not from what witnesses say but from the habits and as-
sociations of the accused." (Adams trans.) Aeschines then used these citations to direct ju-
rors' attention to Timarchus' proffigate ways and questionable associations. For another
example of the use of poetry in a forensic setting, see Demosthenes' citation of a portion of




Admittedly, even with these parallels, only the basis of legal
education has been identified. The fact that Sophistic instructors
did not train their students in the analysis of sources of law cannot
be overlooked. Nor should it be forgotten that Sophists often
served as speechwriters for, not as direct representatives of, their
clients. Both of these factors could be accounted for, and the anal-
ogy thus defended in all its details, if allowance were made for dif-
ferences between the legal systems of Athens and the modern
world. But instead of forcing the analogy, it is best to concede its
incompleteness while still emphasizing its fundamental strength.
Within limits set by historical context, then, law school Socratic
method is, ironically, the method of Protagorean education.
CONCLUSION
Rather than summarize a fairly straightforward argument, it
might be helpful to offer a final, and cautionary, example of the
uses that can be made of Sophistic paideia. The example is taken
from a speech by Protagoras' fellow-Sophist, Gorgias of Leontini,
since unfortunately none of Protagoras' discourses on legal topics
has survived. 5 Gorgias' speech, which he entitled an "Encomium
on Helen [of Troy]," 6 illustrates many facets of the Sophist's
craft. For instance, it takes a text, in this case the Iliad itself, as
the basis of discussion. Also, it is addressed to an issue of legal and
moral concern, namely the responsibility that individuals bear for
85. According to DIOGENEs LAERTiS, supra note 23, at 55, one of Protagoras' treatises
was Of Forensic Speech for a Fee, Two Books of Opposing Arguments.
86. The Encomium can be found at 2 DieLs, supra note 5, at 288-94 and K. FREEMAN,
supra note 5, at 131-33. It should be noted that this speech is an encomium, which involves
a different kind of oratory than the forensic variety. For the addition of a third, political
kind of oratory and an analysis of the distinction between political, epideictic (including
encomia) and forensic speech, see Aristotle's Rhetoric 1, 3. Although the encomium is not a
type of forensic speech, there are nonetheless many good reasons for using this defense of
Helen rather than Gorgias' set-piece in forensic oratory, The Defense of Palamedes. First,
modern readers are unlikely to remember the story of Palamedes from the Odyssey whereas
most people have heard of Helen even if they have never read the Iliad. Second, Gorgias'
speech takes the form of a defense even though it is admittedly more freewheeling than a
forensic defense might be. Third, we have the judgment of Isocrates himself that Gorgias'
speech is forensic, not epideictic in nature. See Isocrates' Helen 14-15, where he states that
"although [Gorgias] asserts that he has written an encomium of Helen, it turns out that he
has actually spoken a defense of her conduct." (Van Hook trans.) Isocrates' judgment justi-
fies the use of Gorgias' speech to illustrate forensic oratory, although it should be recalled
that forensic speeches were rarely as daring as this encomium.
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their conduct. And, perhaps most interesting of all, it seeks to de-
fend what was widely believed then and now to be the weaker
cause-to show that Helen cannot be held responsible for fleeing
with Paris.
In his encomium, Gorgias offered three exculpatory arguments
for Helen. He claimed that "[s]he acted as she did either through
fate and the will of the gods and decrees of Necessity, or because
she was seized by force, or won over by persuasion, or captivated
by love.1817 The first two grounds Gorgias discussed only briefly:
Helen clearly could not be blamed if either necessity or physical
force had controlled her conduct." It was the third possibility that
Gorgias considered at length. Here, too, he claimed that she bore
no responsibility, but he did so by advancing an argument that si-
multaneously enhanced and questioned the stature of Sophistic
technique. He claimed that:
The power of speech over the constitution of the soul can be compared with
the effect of drugs on the bodily state; just as drugs . . . can put an end
either to the disease or to life, so with speech: different words can induce
grief, pleasure or fear; or again, .by-means of harmful kind of persuasion,
words can drug and bewitch the soul.89
Gorgias' argument is a two-edged sword, for perhaps the persua-
sive techniques employed by Paris were of the harmful kind, but
perhaps those of Gorgias were as well, in which case his audience
could have become so "drugged" that they would not have been
able to consider dispassionately the question of Helen's responsi-
bility. By treating Paris as an advocate, then, Gorgias may have
succeeded in exonerating Helen; but he did so only by casting
doubt on the integrity of advocacy itself.
There is no need to belabor these disturbing implications in
Gorgias' encomium. The Protagorean injunction to make the
weaker cause the stronger encourages a willingness to see both
sides of an issue, and to this extent it can play a positive role in
education. However, as Plato noted, the injunction can also serve
as an incitement to place forensic technique above moral values.
The challenge for legal education is to balance both these
points-to recognize and accept the Sophistic principles that are
87. 2 DmLs, supra note 5, at 289; K. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 131.
88. 2 DEaLs, supra note 5, at 289-90; K. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 131-32.
89. 2 DmLS, supra note 5, at 292-93; K. FREEMAN, supra note 5, at 133.
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essential to the production of good advocates and to add to this a
Socratic awareness of the moral limits of Protagoras' techniques.
In this sense, Socratic method cannot be considered a part of legal
education; but for that very reason, Socratic concerns must remain
relevant to it.

